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FAA AND ARBITRATION CLAUSES - HOW
FAR CAN IT REACH? THE EFFECT OF
ALLIED-BRUCE TERMIN1X, INC. v.
DOBSON
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the powerful current of animosity in English
and American common law courts toward pgrospective agreements
to arbitrate disputes, the 1925 Congress enacted the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (hereinafter "FAA").' The FAA established that "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."2 However, the FAA did
not become an effective tool for avoiding litigation until the 1980s,
when the Supreme Court systematically removed most of the bar-
riers to binding pre-dispute arbitration.
This note discusses Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson,
which solidified the Supreme Court's rationale in favor of arbitra-
tion. The Court specifically held that the FAA governs all arbitra-
tion provisions in contracts "affecting commerce and that the
phrase "affecting commerce signals a Congressional intent to exer-
cise its Commerce Clause powers in full. 3 This note will first pro-
vide a short background of the interpretation of the FAA in
connection with the enforceability of the arbitration clauses, and
then discuss Allied-Bruce and its potential effect on the future of
arbitration clauses.
1. 9 U.S.C.S §§ 1 (Law. Co-op. 1987). See also Henry C. Strickland, The
Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State
Arbitration Law?, 21 HoFsTmA L. REv. 385, 389-90 (1992).
2. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Cons't. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1983).
3. Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 835, 839 (1995) (citing
Russel v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985)).
607
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II. THE CASE
In August 1987, Steven Gwin, who owned a house in Birming-
ham, Alabama, purchased a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan"4
from the local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, a
franchise of Terminix International Company.5 The contract docu-
ment, provided in writing that "any controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to the interpretation, performance or breach of
any provision of this agreement shall be settled exclusively by
arbitration."'
In the spring of 1991, the Gwins, wishing to sell their house to
the Dobsons, had Allied-Bruce re-inspect the house and issue
them a clean bill of health.7 Upon purchase of the house (with the
plan included), the Dobsons found the house swarming with ter-
mites." Allied-Bruce's efforts to cure the problem were inade-
quate.9 Hence, the Dobsons sued the Gwins and (along with the
Gwins who cross-claimed) also sued Allied-Bruce and Terminix in
Alabama state court.10 Allied-Bruce and Terminix, pointing to the
Plan's arbitration clause and 2 of the FAA, immediately asked the
court for a stay, to allow arbitration to proceed. 1 The court denied
the stay. Allied-Bruce and Terminix appealed. 2
The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the denial of the stay
on the basis of a state statute,'3 making written, pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements invalid and unenforceable. 4 The Alabama
court reached this conclusion by finding that the FAA, which pre-
empts conflicting state law, did not apply to the termite contract.15
It considered the FAA inapplicable because the connection
4. In the Plan, Allied-Bruce promised "to protect" Gwin's house "against
attack of subterranean termites," to reinspect periodically, to provide any
"further treatment found necessary" and to repair up to $100,000 damage caused
by new termite infestations. Terminix International "guaranteed the fulfillment
of the terms" of the plan. Id. (citing App. at 70).
5. Id. at 837.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993).
14. Allied Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 837 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix,
Inc. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1993)).
15. Id.
608 [Vol. 19:607
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 11
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/11
ALLIED-BRUCE TERmINw, INC. v. DoBsoN
between the termite contract and interstate commerce was too
slight.' 6 According to the court, the FAA applied to a contract
only if "at the time [the parties entered into the contract] and
accepted the arbitration clause, they contemplated substantial
interstate activity."' 7 Other state and federal courts had offered
similar interpretations.' 8 However, several federal appellate
courts had interpreted the same language, as reaching to the lim-
its of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 19 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.20
Despite the Alabama Supreme Court's strong showing of pub-
lic policy in favor of its decision,2 ' the Supreme Court reversed
and held that the statutory language, "involving commerce, is the
functional equivalent of the traditional "affecting commerce, and
represents congressional intent that the statute embrace the full
limit of legislative power under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.22
In a separate concurrence,23 Justice O'Connor expressed her
view that the Court "laid a faulty foundation"24 in Southland
Corp. v. Keating,25 but she found no "special justification" to over-
rule it. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Justice Scalia
found that Southland "clearly misconstrued the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act,"26 and said that he would be willing to join four other
justices in overruling it. 27 Justice Thomas, in a lengthy dissent
joined by Justice Scalia,28 wrote that Southland was wrongly
16. Id.
17. Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1993) (quoting
Warren v. Jim Skinner Ford, 548 So. 2d 157, 160 (Ala. 1989)).
18. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 155 S.Ct. at 837 (citing Burke County Pub. Sch.
Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981); R.J.
Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 642 P.2d. 127 (1982);
Lacheney v. Profitkey Int'l, 818 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Va. 1993)).
19. Id. (citing Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1986); Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959); Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d
409 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984)).
20. Id.
21. See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 628 So. 2d 354.
22. Allied Bruce Terminix, 115 S.Ct at 836.
23. Id. at 843.
24. Id. at 844.
25. 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (this case made the FAA applicable in state courts).
26. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S.Ct. at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Id.
1997] 609
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decided.29 He argued that the arbitration agreements are proce-
dural, and "it would have been extraordinary for congress to pre-
scribe procedural rules for state courts."30 Justice Thomas stated
that the FAA applies only in the federal courts.3 '
III. THE BACKGROUND
Historically, agreements to arbitrate have not been favorably
considered by the courts, which feared that they were being
ousted of their jurisdiction.3" Therefore, in order to overcome this
"anachronism of the American law,33 the U.S. Congress enacted
the Federal Arbitration Act.34 One of the purposes of the enact-
ment was to eliminate judicial hostility toward arbitration
agreements.35
29. Id.
30. Id. at 846.
31. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 838; see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 115 S. Ct.
1212 (1995) (holding that arbitrators can award punitive damages
notwithstanding the fact that state law prohibits them); Volt Information
Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (both majority and dissent
mention the historical reluctance of courts to enforce arbitration agreements);
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (stating that the
origins of these refusals to enforce arbitration lie in ancient times, when the
English courts fought for extension of jurisdiction - all of them being opposed to
anything that would altogether deprive every one of them of jurisdiction);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (dealing briefly with courts'
reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements and holding the FAA applicable in
state courts).
33. The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American
law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts
for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to
arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from
their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that the
principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was
adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the
precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative
enactment, although they have frequently criticized the rule and
recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it.
This bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be
enforced, and provides a procedure in Federal courts for their
enforcement.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924)).
34. 9 U.S.C.S. § 1 (1987).
35. The legislative history of the Act establishes that the purpose behind
its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made
610 [Vol. 19:607
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The FAA § 2 provides that any
written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction
shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.38
Despite clear congressional intent regarding the enforcement of
arbitration clauses in contracts, several questions have arisen and
have been litigated over the years.
One of the questions was whether the FAA represented an
exercise of Congress' Article III power to "ordain and establish"
federal courts.3 7 In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co.,"s the Court rejected this view and held that the FAA "is based
upon and confined to the incontestible federal foundations of con-
trol over interstate commerce and over admiralty."39 Therefore,
the power of the FAA is derived from the Commerce Clause.
Intrinsically related to the question of whether the FAA repre-
sented the exercise of Congressional power under Article III, was
the issue of the FAA's applicability in diversity cases.40 Agreeing
that the FAA sets forth substantive law, the Prima Paint Court
nonetheless concluded that the act applied in diversity cases
because Congress had so intended.41
agreements to arbitrate. We therefore reject the suggestion that the
overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious
resolution of claims. The Act, after all, does not mandate the arbitration
of all claims, but merely the enforcement-upon the motion of one of the
parties-of privately negotiated arbitration agreements.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 219.
36. 9 U.S.C.S. § 2 (1987). The FAA also provides procedures for enforcing
valid arbitration agreements. Section 3 provides for a stay of proceedings "in any
of the courts of the United States" on an issue that is subject to a valid
arbitration agreement. Section 4 provides procedures for obtaining a court order
to compel a recalcitrant party to proceed with arbitration as agreed. The FAA
further provides procedures for appointing arbitrators (§ 5), and issuing
subpoenas to witnesses (§ 7), grounds for judicial enforcement (§ 9), modification
(§ 11) and annulment of arbitration awards (§ 10).
37. U.S. CONsT., art. III, §1.
38. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
39. Id. at 405 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1 (1924)).
40. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-80 (1938) (made clear that
federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases).
41. "Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves
with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to
1997]
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The holding in Prima Paint led to the question whether Con-
gress intended the Act also to apply in state courts. In Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,42 the Supreme
Court held that the FAA created a body of federal substantive law
that is applicable in both state and federal courts.4 3 This ruling
was confirmed in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 4 which held that
the FAA pre-empts state law and that state courts cannot apply
state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements.4 5 The court
emphasized that the FAA had created a body of federal substan-
tive law, based on Congress' commerce clause power, regarding
the enforceability of arbitration clauses.
The holdings in Prima Paint and Southland "federalized the
law of arbitration by establishing the FAA as the generally appli-
cable substantive law of arbitration in the United States.4 6 With
these cases the Supreme Court laid the basis for a policy in favor
of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. However, prior to
Allied-Bruce a conflict had arisen as to the interpretation of the
FAA in federal appellate courts and state courts.
At least three federal circuit courts addressing the reach of
the FAA had held that the act's reach is coextensive with Con-
gress' broad power to regulate interstate commerce.47 In other
words, the FAA applies to transactions which relate in any way, or
affect to interstate commerce. In Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devon-
shire Fabrics, Inc.,48 the Second Circuit stated that, when Con-
gress enacted the FAA, it "intended to exercise as much of the
constitutional power as it could in order to make the Act as widely
effective as possible."49 Later, in Foster v. Turley, 50 the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the requirement that the underlying transaction
"involve commerce" must be broadly construed "so as to be co-
extensive with congressional power to regulate under the Com-
merce Clause."51 Finally, in Snyder v. Smith,52 the Seventh Cir-
legislate." Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 388 U.S. 395, 405
(1967).
42. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
43. Id. at 23-26.
44. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
45. Id. at 15-16.
46. See Strickland, supra note 1, at 396.
47. See supra note 19.
48. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
49. Id. at 406.
50. 808 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1986).
51. Id. at 40.
612 [Vol. 19:607
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cuit similarly concluded that Congress intended the FAA to reach
the fullest extent of the commerce clause.5 3
Nevertheless, a number of state courts, trying to escape the
effect of Southland, which conflicted with a number of state anti-
arbitration statutes, went on to interpret the FAA's language nar-
rowly as requiring the parties to a contract to have "contemplated"
an interstate commerce connection.54
IV. ANALYSIS
Against this background the Supreme Court decided whether
the Dobsons were entitled to a jury trial or whether they had to
arbitrate. The first argument presented by the Dobsons was that
Southland should be overruled because Congress had never
intended the FAA to apply in state proceedings.5 5 The Dobsons
were joined by the attorneys general of 20 states, who submitted
an amicus curiae brief urging the Supreme Court to overrule
Southland. The gist of their argument was that the FAA does not
contain a pre-emption clause expressly displacing state law. 6
In his first opinion on the bench, Justice Breyer, writing for
the majority, explained that nothing had occurred in the ten years
since Southland to justify overruling that decision and that, in the
interim, private parties and courts had relied upon Southland and
structured their affairs and decisions accordingly.5 7 Having
declined the invitation to overrule Southland, the Supreme Court
proceeded to address the FAA's reach. The major issue of the case
52. 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). See also
Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir.
1987) (The FAA governs any contracts that "relate to interstate commerce, a
standard that implements the strong federal policy favoring arbitration");
Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European Management and
Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863, 867 (1st Cir. 1981) (The term "commerce" in Section 2 of
the FAA should be "broadly construed"); First Investors Corp. v. American
Capital Fin. Servs., Inc., 823 F.2d 307, 309 (9th Cir. 1987) (The FAA governs
agreements affecting interstate commerce).
53. Snyder, 736 F.2d at 417.
54. See Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C.
408, 417-418, 279 S.E.2d 816, 822 (1981); R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita
Band Instrument Co., Inc., 642 P.2d 127, 130 (Kan. App. 1982).
55. For a comprehensive discussion in support of this rationale see Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56. Brief amici curiae of Attorneys General, Allied-Bruce Terminix Corp. v.
Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995) (No. 93-1001).
57. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S.Ct. at 839.
1997] 613
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was whether the FAA's language, "transaction involving com-
merce," was to be read broadly, as the federal appellate courts had
done, or narrowly, as the Alabama Supreme Court did in the case
under discussion.58 A broad interpretation of these words would
make them equivalent to "affecting commerce"-a phrase which
usually signals full exercise of congressional power 59 over inter-
state commerce, as long as the activity being regulated has sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.6 °
The Court offered several reasons for concluding that the
word "involving", like "affecting", signals an intent to exercise
Congress' commerce power to the full,6 1 . First, it relied on linguis-
tic interpretation,6 2 according to which "involved" and "affect"
sometimes can "mean about the same thing."6 3 Second, the Court
stated that legislative history "indicates an expansive congres-
sional intent."6 4 Third, the Court referred to the broad interpreta-
tions of the FAA set forth in prior Supreme Court decisions 65
58. The Dobsons argued that the express wording of the FAA compels an
inquiry into the parties' intentions at the time they entered into their arbitration
agreement rather than an inquiry into whether the parties' transaction in fact
involved interstate commerce. Hence, the substantial "contemplation" test
applied by the Alabama Supreme Court is consistent with the wording of the
statute. Brief for Respondent, Allied Bruce Terminix Corp. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct.
834 (1995) (No. 93-1001).
59. Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985).
60. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (Congress
could regulate labor relations in the industry since they had a substantial effect
on interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (If an activity
as a class has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, Congress can regulate
such particular activity, regardless of the fact that it may be intrastate); U.S. v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (where the Court again upheld the substantial
effect rationale).
61. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S.Ct. at 841.
62. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 466 (1st ed. 1933) (where the semantic
structure of the word "involve" included also the meaning "include or affect in...
operation.").
63. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S.Ct. at 839.
64. See H.R. Rep. No.96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) (the FAA's "control
over interstate commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate
shipment of goods but also contracts relating to interstate commerce'); 65 CONG.
REC. 1931 (1924) (the FAA "affects contracts relating to interstate subjects and
contracts in admiralty").
65. See e.g. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (the FAA "embodies
Congress' intent to provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within
the full reach of the Commerce Clause"); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (endorsing Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1959)
614 [Vol. 19:607
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which unquestionably support an expansive reading of the FAA.
Finally, the Court concluded that a broad interpretation of
"involving commerce" is consistent with the FAA's basic purpose
to put arbitration provisions on the "same footing as all other con-
tractual clauses."66
After discussing three cases 67 relied upon by the respondent
and stating that they did not affect the above conclusion regarding
the broad interpretation of "involving commerce" phrase, the
Court proceeded to discuss the second question, namely whether
the interstate connection of the transaction had to have been "con-
templated by the parties" or whether a "commerce in fact" test
would be sufficient to decide the applicability of the FAA.68
The Court noted that the Supreme Court of Alabama and sev-
eral other courts had followed the "contemplation of the parties"
test.69 However, such a test had been proven anomalous and not
fitting with the purpose of the Act.70 Instead of a summary and
speedy disposition of petitions to enforce arbitration clauses, the
"contemplation" test would breed more litigation and incur costs
and delays, which Congress had sought to avoid.71 Such interpre-
tation would lead to unrealistic approaches, since the application
of the FAA would depend merely on the state of mind of the par-
ties - whether they had in mind interstate commerce contacts
when they entered into the contract. 72 The Court went on to say
that by rejecting the "contemplation of the parties" test and adopt-
ing the "commerce in fact" test, there was no justified concern that
the Act would excessively encroach upon the powers reserved to
the states by the Constitution or by statute.73
(Congress in enacting the FAA, "took pains to utilize as much of its power as it
could."); Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer et al., 115 S. Ct.
2322 (1995).
66. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 840; see also Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-220 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 511 (1974).
67. Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922);United Leather
Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924); Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
68. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S.Ct. at 841.
69. Id.
70. Id. 841-42.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 842.
73. Id.
1997] 615
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Finally the court rejected the argument of amicus curiae for
an objective version of the "contemplation of the parties" test.
This objective version would allegedly give more protection to con-
sumers asked to sign form contracts with businesses.7 4 The court
noted that the ability to disavow an arbitration clause might bene-
fit a consumer with a potentially large damage claim who wants to
present his case to the jury, but it may equally harm small claim
consumers, who cannot justify the costs of proceeding in court.75
The best way to ensure consumer protection was for the states
to apply general contract law principles and to invalidate an arbi-
tration clause, as permitted by the FAA § 2, "upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."76
However, the FAA prohibits the states to consider a contract fair
and enforceable as to other terms but not as to the arbitration
clause, just because it calls for arbitration. 77 After all, the pur-
pose of the FAA had been to place arbitration clauses on the same
footing as any other contractual provision.78
V. EFFECT OF THE DECISION
The holding in Allied-Bruce rejects any notion that the FAA
does not apply in state courts. In addition, it conclusively rejects
the substantial contemplation test for determining whether the
FAA or state law applies to arbitration clauses. Finally, it set
forth the "commerce in fact" test for determining FAA applicabil-
ity. Under Allied-Bruce the FAA applies to any transaction which
in fact involves or affects commerce, even if the parties did not
contemplate interstate commerce at all.
The applicability of the FAA will now apparently hinge on the
FAA's interstate commerce requirement. Long-standing tradition
and many Supreme Court decisions construing the commerce
power indicate that such power is almost limitless. It extends to
any activity or transaction that "affects interstate commerce."79
When applying this pervasive standard, the Supreme Court has
held that even intrastate activities of a very small scale may be
federally regulated if they might affect commerce when combined
74. Id.
75. Id. at 843.
76. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1987)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-
77 (1981) (citations omitted).
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with similar small-scale activities. In Wickard v. Filburn,80 for
example, the Court held that Congress could use its commerce
power to regulate a farmer's production of grain on his own farm
for his own consumption. Therefore, the reach of Congress' com-
merce power seems to be far-reaching. Accordingly, unless the
transaction is purely local, the FAA should govern the enforceabil-
ity of arbitration provisions in future arbitrability disputes.
However, a subsequent recent Supreme Court decision,
United States v. Lopez, 8 suggests some limitations to this all-
powerful commerce clause. For the first time in 60 years the
Court invalidated a federal statute8 2 on the grounds that the regu-
lation attempted by the statute was beyond Congress' commerce
power. While the Lopez decision may be limited to its facts and,
according to the Court, would not disturb the "substantial effect
on interstate commerce" rationale for activities commercial in
character,8 3 it may indicate a renewed initiative by the Court to
narrow Congress' commerce power.84 In any event, the inference
may be drawn that while the scope of the FAA's applicability is
all-embracing, it is not limitless.
Notwithstanding the Lopez decision, Allied-Bruce will have a
far-reaching effect on the laws of many states, Alabama included,
whose arbitration statutes will not have a prayer under the "com-
merce in fact" test As of now, it appears that only Alabama, Mis-
sissippi and Nebraska still hold that arbitration agreements are
unenforceable absent application of the FAA.1
5
80. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
81. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
82. 18 U.S.C § 922 (g)(A) (1988) (The Gun-Free School Zone Act made it a
federal crime "for any individual to possess a firearm at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.").
83. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1675 (1995).
84. Recall Pre-New Deal decisions such as: Hammer v. Daggenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918) (Court struck down a federal statute which prohibited the interstate
transport of articles produced by companies which employed under-age children,
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding unconstitutional and beyond commerce power a
federal statute which set maximum hours and minimum wages for workers in
coal mines).
85. ALA. CODE. § 8-1-41(3) (1984); see also Ex Parte Clemens, 587 So. 2d 317,
319 (Ala. 1991) ("Unless the FAA is applicable, pre-dispute arbitration
agreements are void in Alabama as against public policy"); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 11-15-101 (Supp. 1992) (Mississippi takes the same view, except for disputes
arising from construction contracts); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to 25-2622
(1989) adopting the Uniform Arbitration Act, was held by Nebraska Supreme
6171997]
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Several other states, though enforcing pre-dispute arbitration
clauses, have codified certain exceptions to their arbitration stat-
utes. For example, the Georgia Arbitration Code liberally pro-
vides for the enforcement of "a written agreement to submit any
existing controversy to arbitration."s However, the Code does not
enforce arbitration agreements in insurance contracts, contracts
related to consumer transactions, agreements to arbitrate future
personal injury or wrongful death tort claims and some loan
agreements and financing agreements.8 7 A few other states have
codified similar exceptions in their arbitration statutes: Arkansas,
Indiana, Kansas, Ohio, South Carolina.88
Since contractual arbitration clauses will now be routinely
enforced, a consideration of certain advantages or disadvantages
of these clauses is necessary before submitting to arbitration as a
means of dispute resolution. The advantages of arbitration will
depend on the circumstances. First, arbitration is usually time-
saving and less expensive than jury trials; but the speed of this
process may oftentimes be detrimental to someone who has an
interest in delaying resolution of the dispute. Second, arbitration
procedures are less formal and technical than court procedures.
However, arbitration may still result in unfavorable, irrational
and arbitrary results. In these circumstances judicial recourse to
overturn an unfavorable reward is very difficult. Third, arbitra-
tion provides a greater measure of finality than litigation. Fourth,
arbitration is more flexible and the parties usually have more con-
trol over it and over the selection of the arbitrators than in a court
procedure. Fifth, arbitration offers more privacy than the litiga-
tion of a dispute. Finally, while litigation is prone to produce win-
ners and losers who harbor bitter feelings towards each other,
Court, in State v. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577 (Neb.
1991), as violating the Nebraska Constitution to the extent that it requires
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes.
86. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to 9-9-43 (Supp. 1992).
87. Id.
88. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-108-201 (1987) (excluding personal injury, tort
matters or employer-employee disputes); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-1(b) (West
1987) (excluding all consumer leases, sales, and loan contracts); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 5-401 (c) (Supp. 1986) (excluding insurance contracts, employer-employee
disputes and contracts providing for arbitration of tort claims); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2711.01 (B)(1) (1992) (excluding certain disputes concerning title to land);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (B)(2) (1976 & Supp. 1991) (excluding workers
compensation claims, personal injury claims and claims under any insurance
policy or annuity contract).
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arbitration can be used as a tool to find solutions to maintain rela-
tionships. Considering all these advantages and the assurance
that nearly all arbitration clauses will be enforced under the FAA,
it seems that arbitration as a means of dispute resolution will be
more widely utilized.
VI. EFFECT ON THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW
A. North Carolina and the "Contemplation of the Parties" Test
Like many other states, North Carolina used to conform to
the old common law rule which made all agreements to arbitrate
future disputes unenforceable.8 9 However, in August 1973 with
the policy favoring arbitration growing stronger, the North Caro-
lina legislature amended the arbitration law.90 The amendment
provided that agreements to arbitrate future disputes are binding
and irrevocable. 91 Several later decisions have upheld this strong
public policy in favor of arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution. 9
2
89. Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408,
409, 279 S.E.2d 816, 817 (1981). Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-544 provided:
Agreements to arbitrate. Two or more parties may agree in writing to
submit to arbitration, in conformity with the provisions of this article,
any controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement to
submit: Such an agreement shall be valid and enforceable, and neither
party shall have the power to revoke the submission without the consent
of the other party or parties to the submission save upon such grounds
as exist in law or equity for the rescission or revocation of any contract.
The interpretation of this provision had been that agreements to arbitrate could
not oust the courts of their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Skinner v. Gaither Corp., 234
N.C. 385, 67 S.E.2d 267 (1951).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2 (1973).
91. N.C. GEN STAT. 1-567.2 (1973) provides:
Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration any
controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement, or they
may include in a written contract a provision for the settlement by
arbitration of any controversy thereafter arising between them relating
to such contract or the failure or refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof. Such agreement or provision shall be valid, enforceable,
and irrevocable except with the consent of all parties, without regard to
the justiciable character of the controversy.
92. Johnston County v. R.N. Rouse & Co., 331 N.C. 88, 91, 414 S.E.2d 30, 32
(1992) ("Our strong public policy requires that the courts resolve any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues in favor of arbitration."); see also
Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Constr. Co., 316 N.C. 543, 544, 342 S.E.2d 853, 854
(1986); Cyclone Roofing Co. v. LaFave Co., 312 N.C. 224, 321 S.E.2d 872 (1984);
Miller v. Two State Constr. Co., 118 N.C. App. 412, 455 S.E.2d 678 (1995).
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The landmark case in North Carolina regarding arbitration is
Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership.93
Burke involved a service contract between a multi-state architec-
tural firm and a local Indiana school board for the designing of two
school buildings. Upon completion of one of the buildings, the
plaintiff discovered a roof leak which would require extensive
repairs. Alleging a design defect, plaintiff brought action for
$150,000 in damages for breach of contract. The defendant moved
to stay the proceedings filing a demand for arbitration of the dis-
pute with the American Arbitration Association in accordance
with the provisions of the contract.94 The Court of Appeals denied
the stay, concluding that the contract between the parties was not
a transaction involving interstate commerce within the meaning
of the FAA.9 5 Therefore the plaintiff had the right to disregard
the agreement to arbitrate future disputes and institute
litigation.96
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that a
contract need not contemplate the interstate shipment of goods in
order to evidence a transaction involving commerce within the
meaning of Section 2 of the FAA. "Where, however, performance of
the contract itself, including a personal service contract, necessar-
ily involves, so that the parties to the agreement must have con-
templated, substantial interstate activity the contract evidences a
transaction involving commerce within the meaning of the
FAA."9 7 Therefore, the FAA would pre-empt any conflicting state
law and the arbitration provision would be enforced.
The Court adopted Judge Lumbard's widely-held approach-
known as "contemplation of the parties" test-according to which:
[T]he significant question is not whether, in carrying out the
terms of the contract, the parties did cross state lines, but
whether, at the time they entered into it and accepted the arbitra-
93. 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981).
94. Article Eleven of the contract provided: "All claims, disputes and other
matters in question arising out of... his Agreement or the breach shall be
decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules of the American Association then obtaining. This agreement so to
arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law."
Id. at 409, 279 S.E.2d at 817.
95. Id. at 410-410, 279 S.E.2d at 818.
96. Id. at 410, 279 S.E.2d at 817. (The Court of Appeals found that the
dispute was governed by the former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-544 since the contract
had been entered into in 1969, prior to the amended arbitration law of 1973.).
97. Burke, 303 N.C. at 418, 279 S.E.2d at 822.
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tion clause, they contemplated substantial interstate activity.
Cogent evidence regarding their state of mind at the time would
be the terms of the contract, and if it, on its face, evidences inter-
state traffic the contract should come within - 2.98
Later cases confirmed the adoption of the "contemplation of
the parties" test. In In the Matter of Arbitration Between Cohoon
and Ziman,99 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that evi-
dence presented in trial "was sufficient to support conclusion that
interstate activity was contemplated by the parties to a partner-
ship agreement, and therefore such agreement was covered by the
FAA. 10 0 In Bennish v. North Carolina Theater, Inc. ,101 the Court
of Appeals held that the contract between the dance theater and
the dancer which contained an arbitration clause under which
either party could demand arbitration was within the FAA,
"because there is sufficient evidence that the contract contem-
plated substantial interstate activity. " 10 2 Both these decisions
relied on Burke and on Judge Lumbard's "contemplation of the
parties" test.
Thus, North Carolina, like Alabama, has been committed to a
narrow interpretation of the FAA language "involving commerce,
making the interstate commerce connection dependant on the con-
templation of the parties, on their state of mind, when they
entered into the contract.
B. Allied-Bruce Terminix "Terminates" North Carolina's
'Contemplation of the Parties" Test
It appears that after the Allied-Bruce decision the North Car-
olina courts' narrow interpretation of the FAA language "involv-
ing commerce" and the endorsement of the "contemplation of the
parties" test will no longer be valid. 10 3 Under the new broad
interpretation of the language, as a functional equivalent of
"affecting commerce," and the far-reaching "commerce in fact"
98. Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 817 (1961).
99. 60 N.C. App 226, 298 S.E.2d 729 (1983).
100. Id. at 229, 298 S.E.2d at 731.
101. 108 N.C. App. 42, 422 S.E.2d 335 (1992).
102. Id. at 45, 422 S.E.2d at 337.
103. The Allied-Bruce opinion made specific reference to Burke County Public
Schools Bd. of Ed. v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981),
criticizing it along with other state courts for having adopted a narrow
interpretation of the FAA language and resorted to the "contemplation of the
parties" test. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S.Ct. at 841.
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test, any remote connection with interstate commerce will make
arbitration agreements enforceable under the FAA. Furthermore,
the new sweeping "commerce in fact" test may displace some of
the North Carolina arbitration law. For example, the provision
that excludes employer-employee disputes from arbitration agree-
ments' 4 may fall under the challenge of the new test. The FAA
will be almost always applicable since the burden of showing a
connection between the dispute at issue and the interstate com-
merce connection will not be hard to carry. 10 5
The uncertainty of the potential ramifications of Allied-Bruce
is demonstrated by the North Carolina legislature's recent amend-
ment to the forum selection clause statute. 0 6 The statute still
provides that "any provision in a contract entered into in North
Carolina that requires the prosecution of any action or the arbitra-
tion of any dispute that arises from a contract to be instituted or
heard in another state is against public policy and is void and
enforceable." 10 7 After Allied-Bruce, if the contract will affect or
involve interstate commerce (for which very little is needed), arbi-
tration will be enforceable under the FAA. Consequently, the
North Carolina law will be pre-empted by the federal law.
It is interesting to note that while arbitration provisions will
be enforceable, other contract provisions which require the con-
tract to be governed by the law and forum of another state, will
not enjoy the same preferential treatment. Under North Carolina
law such terms will still be void and unenforceable. Hence, arbi-
tration provisions in this context are placed not "on the same foot-
ing"'08 but on better footing than other contract terms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Allied-Bruce appears to be a major victory for supporters of
arbitration. It guarantees that if a contract involves or affects
interstate commerce, the pro-arbitration standards contained in
the FAA will govern the enforcement of an arbitration provision in
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2 (b) (1996) ("This section shall not apply to (b)
Arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between their
respective representatives, unless the agreement provides that this Article shall
apply.").
105. See supra pp. 13-14.
106. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 22B-3 (1996).
107. Id. However, this section specifically provides that "this prohibition will
not apply to non-consumer loan transactions".
108. See supra note 66.
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the contract. Parties submitting to arbitration will no longer face
the legislative barriers of differing state standards or the judicial
hostility against the enforcement of arbitration clauses. It's still
too early to see how courts around the country will react to this
decision. Naturally, courts and attorneys may still resort to crea-
tive ways to void arbitration clauses "upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."10 9 However,
the odds of invalidating arbitration clauses in contracts affecting
commerce seem to be very slim, if not impossible.110
Edmond Seferi
109. This possibility was left open in Allied-Bruce which expressly provided
that "States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general
contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause 'upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'" Allied-
Bruce Terminix, 115 S.Ct. at 843 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1987)).
110. Mastrobuono, 115 S.Ct. 1212, one of the latest incursions of the Supreme
Court into the arbitration area, accomplished a further expansion of the FAA, by
upholding arbitrator's power to award punitive damages notwithstanding state
law that prohibits such an award.
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